Attorney and Client- Attorney\u27s Rights Under Contract of Partial Assignment-Effet of Premature Termination or Settlement of Action by Frederickson, Charles, S.Ed
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 61 Issue 1 
1962 
Attorney and Client- Attorney's Rights Under Contract of Partial 
Assignment-Effet of Premature Termination or Settlement of 
Action 
Charles Frederickson S.Ed 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the 
Legal Profession Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles Frederickson S.Ed, Attorney and Client- Attorney's Rights Under Contract of Partial Assignment-
Effet of Premature Termination or Settlement of Action, 61 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1962). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol61/iss1/5 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS 
ATIORNEY AND CLIENT-ATIORNEY'S RIGHTS UNDER CONTRACT OF PAR-
TIAL AsSIGNMENT-EFFECT OF PREMATURE TERMINATION OR SETTLEMENT OF 
ACTION-In an action for personal injuries, defendant caused a subpoena 
to be served upon plaintiff requiring him to appear to give his deposition. 
Plaintiff wholly failed to appear, and no cause was shown for such failure. 
Defendant then filed a motion for dismissal of the suit pursuant to sub-
section (c), 215a, of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and notice thereof 
was served upon plaintiff. Although plaintiff again made no appearance, 
his attorneys moved to intervene, asserting the contingent interest in the 
cause of action acquired by their contract with plaintiff. The trial court 
denied the motion for intervention and dismissed the suit as to both plain-
tiff and the attorneys. On appeal by the attorneys, held, reversed. An attor-
ney may contract for a partial assignment in a client's cause of action and, 
as an assignee, may intervene to protect his share of the claim. Benton v. 
Dow Chemical Co., 351 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). 
A contingent fee contract, unaccompanied by an assignment, gives an 
attorney no right in his client's cause of action before final judgment is 
rendered,1 and, under such circumstances, an attorney may not intervene 
in the suit for the purpose of prosecuting it on his own behalf.2 However, 
an assignment of an interest in a client's cause of action,3 as distinguished 
from a contingent fee contract, immediately vests certain rights in an 
attorney. If the person allegedly liable has notice of the assignment,4 and 
proceeds to compromise the claim with the client before judgment, the at-
torney may intervene in the original suit and prosecute it to conclusion for 
his own portion.5 Assignment contracts have been recognized in Texas for 
over seventy years6 and represent the general practice in personal injury liti-
1 Browne v. King, Ill Tex. 330, 235 S.W. 522 (1921); Texas &: N.O. Ry. v. Marshall, 
184 S.W. 643 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916). For similar holdings in other jurisdictions, see 
Annot., 124 A.L.R. 1509 (1940). 
2 Carroll v. Hunt, 140 Tex. 424, 168 S.W.2d 238 (1943); Wheeler v. Fronhoff, 270 
S.W. 887 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). 
3 If the contract refers to the claim and states that the client "sells, conveys, transfers 
and assigns" an interest in the claim to the attorney, the attorney is vested immediately 
with the described interest. Powell v. Galveston, H. &: S.A. Ry., 78 S.W. 975 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1904). This was the language of the contract in the principal case. 
4 Actual notice may be proved. TEX. R.Ev. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6636 (1960), provides 
for statutory notice when a copy of the assignment is filed with the papers of the suit. 
5 Powell v. Galveston, H. &: S.A. Ry., 78 S.W. 975 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904); Texas &: 
Pac. Ry. v. Vaughan, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 403, 40 S.W. 1065 (1897); Gibson v. Texas Pac. Coal 
Co., 266 S.W. 137 (Tex. Comm. App. 1924). Other available remedies would allow the 
attorney either to ratify the settlement and sue the person liable for his share, or to 
sue the client for his portion of the settlement. Gulf, C. &: S.F. Ry. v. Stubbs, 166 S.W. 
699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914). As to the statutes creating attorneys' liens, see generally 
Annot., 67 A.L.R. 442, 448-60 (1930). 
6 Stewart v. Houston &: T.C. Ry., 62 Tex. 246 (1884). 
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gation in that state.7 However, there is seemingly little justification for 
giving an attorney the added protection of an assignment contract. Although 
intervention is a useful device in appropriate circumstances, in the context 
of the attorney-client relationship, absent any fraud, allowing intervention 
by an attorney holding a contract of assignment results in pitting the at-
torney against a defendant whose actions allegedly injured a party legally 
barred from recovery. Such an accommodation to an attorney in securing his 
fee seemingly in no way facilitates the primary purpose of allowing the re-
covery of damages in a tort action-to make the plaintiff himself whole. 
In moving for dismissal of the suit, the defendant asserted subsection 
(c), 215a, of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure8 (derived from rule 37(d) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), which gives the trial judge dis-
cretion to dismiss a party's suit for failure to facilitate court-sanctioned 
discovery. The Texas procedural rule relied on by the defendant became 
effective in 1957, and there are as yet no decided cases interpreting it. How-
ever, the corresponding federal rule has been held to allow dismissal of only 
those parties actually at fault. Thus, where five of eight plaintiffs failed 
to appear for deposition, dismissal was appropriate only to those five, and 
the remaining three were permitted to continue.9 In applying the rule to 
a situation involving an intervening plaintiff, a federal court has held that 
although a final order of dismissal was entered against the original plaintiff 
for failure to comply with discovery procedures, the intervenor-plaintiffs 
could continue the suit, since they never had control or custody of the par-
ticular documents sought and were without fault.10 An analogous problem 
is presented by a partial assignment contract which passes a separate interest 
in the cause of action to the assignee. It would follow that by application for 
intervention such assignee should also be able to protect his interest from a 
dismissal occasioned through no fault of his own. No real prejudice to the 
opposing party would ordinarily result,11 for his right to discovery of the 
7 TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5525 (1958) has been held to allow the assignment 
of personal injury claims. At common law personal injury claims died with the person 
and hence were not assignable. As to the statutory assignability of these claims in other 
jurisdictions, see generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 500 (1955). 
s "Failure of Party or Witness to Attend. If a party . . • except for good cause 
shown, fails to appear before the officer who is to take his oral deposition • • . after 
proper service of subpoena, the court in which the action is pending on motion and 
notice may ••• dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof. • • ." (Emphasis 
added.) 
9 Demeulenaere v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
10 Societe Internationale v. McGranery, 111 :F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953). The decision 
was later reversed as to the original plaintiffs in Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 
U.S. 197 (1958). 
11 Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897), held that due process of law was violated 
by the entering of a default judgment against a defendant who was in contempt of 
court for failure to pay into court the sum of money in dispute in the suit. Hammond 
Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909) concerned a state statute under which a 
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assignee's case remains, and thi~ necessarily includes proof of the assignor's 
claim. And should the assignor's testimony be necessary to the assignee, a 
refusal by the assignor, as a witness, to give deposition would subject him to 
contempt proceedings.12 
Granting the fairness of the interpretation of subsection (c), 215a, as to 
an intervening assignee, it is submitted that in its application to the attorney-
client relation, such intervention is supported by neither former decision 
nor sound policy. The practice of partial assignments in a cause of action 
was first recognized in Texas in order to protect a plaintiff's attorney from 
fraudulent interference with his compensation.13 In those cases a defendant, 
apprised of the attorney's interest, was able to obtain a low settlement by 
excluding the attorney from the compromise. From this narrow precedent 
evolved the broad language cited in the principal case-that the interest 
of an attorney who had an assignment could not be defeated by the client's 
dismissal of the suit.14 Yet the court dismissed the suit in the principal case, 
not the client. Moreover, there was no attempt here by the defendant 
wrongfully to prejudice the attorney's rights. As such, policies designed to 
counteract fraud should have no application in the principal case. 
The better approach would allow an attorney to intervene and prosecute 
an action to judgment only where there has in fact been a fraudulent at-
tempt to deprive him of his compensation under a contingent fee contract.15 
Apart from a "fraudulent compromise" situation, the attempt to protect 
an attorney by allowing him to accept a partial assignment of his client's 
cause of action preponderates adversely to a reasoned public policy. The 
default judgment was entered against a defendant for failure to comply with court• 
ordered discovery. This statute was held not to violate due process. The court said 
that the law-making power could create a presumption of fact that a refusal to produce 
evidence was an admission of want of merit in the asserted defense. The Federal Advisory 
Committee in 19!18 cited the distinction between these cases in its notes to rule !17. 
Though the defendant might contend that a "presumption" of want of merit in the 
plaintiff's claim arose in the principal case, it should be noted that in the twenty-four 
year history of rule 37(d), no court has relied on this "presumption" in order to sustain 
its power under the rule. Discovery practice rests in the inherent power of the court; 
a legal fiction has no place here. 
12 Subsection (c), 215a, also provides that "any Witness who, except for good cause 
shown, fails to appear before the officer who is to take his oral deposition • • • may 
be punished as for contempt of the court in which the action is pending. • • ." 
13 Stewart v. Houston &: T.C. Ry., 62 Tex. 246 (1884). See also cases cited note 5 supra. 
14 See principal case at 900. See also 7 TEX. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 98 (1959). 
15 Where there has been a fraudulent attempt to deprive an attorney of his com-
pensation the attorney has been allowed to intervene and prosecute the action to judg-
ment to protect his contingent fee. Bennett v. Sinclair Nav. Co., 33 F. Supp. (E.D. Pa. 
1940); Ekelman v. G. Marano Realty Corp., 251 N.Y. 173, 167 N.E. 211 (1929); Finkelstein 
v. Roberts, 220 S.W. 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). See generally Annot., 67 A.L.R. 442, 462-67 
(1930). On the possibility of a suit against the defendant for malicious interference with 
contract, see Bennett v. Sinclair Nav. Co., supra. Contra, Krause v. Hartford Acc.&: Indem. 
Co., 331 Mich. 19, 49 N.W.2d 41 (1951). 
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introduction of the attorney as an interested third party into what is nor-
mally a two-party compromise situation necessarily frustrates the settled 
policy of the law to encourage settlement and discourage litigation. Texas 
courts have recognized this policy, but only in its application to divorce 
actions, in which assignment contracts are held to be unenforceable after 
a reconciliation of the parties.16 Moreover, an assignment contract produces 
two claims for possible compromise by vesting the attorney with a separate 
interest in the cause of action entirely his own. In comparison, a contingent 
fee interest in the settlement, absent an assignment, is seemingly sufficient 
to guarantee the plaintiff a wholehearted bargaining effort on his behalf 
by the attorney during settlement negotiations. And, from the client's point 
of view, no greater benefits are derived from an assignment contract than 
from the usual contingent fee agreement. 
Thus, barring any fraud, should a client decide to compromise a claim 
over his attorney's objection, he should be able to do so, since the client 
was the one injured, and the lawsuit is his own. If the attorney is not satis-
fied with his contingent share of the settlement, a quasi-contractual remedy 
would usually be available.17 The historical justification for contingent fee 
contracts was to enable the penniless client to obtain competent legal coun-
sel. Assignment contracts shift the emphasis from the layman's plight to 
overt protection for the attorney. 
Charles Frederickson, S.Ed 
16 Kull v. Brown, 165 S.W .2d 1011 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Kelly v. Gross, 4 S.W .2d 
296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). See 7 TEX. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 104 (1959). See generally 
Annot., 45 A.L.R. 941 (1926) as to the right of an attorney to continue a divorce suit 
against the wishes of his client. 
17 For a discussion of an attorney's right to a remedy in quasi-contract after settle-
ment by the client, see Note, 15 U. DEr. L.J. 146 (1951). 
